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Moral views and perceptions, their ethical evaluation and justification, and practical concerns about how to 
incorporate them all play important roles in research and practice in the information systems discipline. This 
paper develops a model of normative issues ranging from moral intuition and explicit morality to ethical theory 
and meta-ethical reflection. After showing that this normative model is relevant to IS and that it allows an 
improved understanding of normative issues, the paper discusses these levels of normativity in the context of 
two of the most prominent normative topics in IS: Privacy and intellectual property. The paper then suggests 
that a more explicit understanding of the different aspects of normativity would benefit IS research. This would 
leverage the traditional empirical strengths of IS research and use them to develop research that is relevant 
beyond the boundaries of the discipline. Such broader relevance could be aimed at the reference disciplines. 
In particular, moral philosophy could benefit from understanding information technology and its role in 
organizations in more detail. It could, furthermore, inform policy makers who are increasingly called on to 
regulate new information technologies. 
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1. Introduction 
Humans are social beings. Because of their social nature, they need rules, norms, and conventions that 
allow them to co-exist and collaborate to survive and prosper. The information systems (IS) discipline is 
interested in the social and organizational role of information technology. Therefore, it needs to take this 
into account. Discussions of norms, acceptance, and acceptability of rules and conventions are central 
to understanding phenomena related to technology. They are similarly important if recommendations 
and policies are developed to influence practice.  
 
However, there are different ways in which IS scholars can take normative issues into account. At a 
basic level, one rather functional way would be to recognize that attention to normative issues can 
contribute to user satisfaction and thereby reduce the chance of system failure. 
 
At a higher level of abstraction, one can find normative assumptions in all IS research paradigms: 
Positivism has its roots in the enlightenment-based attempt to improve the human condition by applying 
scientific methods to understanding social life (Wynn, 2001); interpretivism implies a significance and 
equality of the other who is being investigated and has, therefore, been viewed as intrinsically ethical 
(Walsham, 1995a, 1995b, 1996); critical research has been traced to the ethical attempt to improve the 
world (Hirschheim & Klein, 1994; Myers & Klein, 2011; Stahl, 2008a). 
 
A further link between normative issues and IS comes from IS practice. Normative issues in a broad 
sense pervade all social activities, which includes commercial ones. The use of IT for business 
purposes is closely related to efficiency and effectiveness, which, in turn, touch on how we should live 
our lives and which goals we should follow. 
 
At the broadest level of abstraction, ethical investigation is related to the use of computing or information 
and communication technologies (ICT) in social or organizational settings. Many IS studies take place in 
a business environment. As a consequence, it is of interest not only to IS scholars but also to 
organizational, management, or business scholars in general. This means that business or economic 
ethics can be applied to IS. Thus, the business ethics discipline has paid significant attention to ICT’s 
ethical aspects (George, 2002; Grabner-Kraeuter, 2002). 
 
This brief outline shows that there are numerous areas of contact between IS and normative issues. 
Despite a wealth of work in the area, there have been few attempts to draw a broader picture of 
normativity in IS research and practice. Therefore, this paper develops a deeper understanding of the 
role of normativity in IS research. 
 
In order to do this, the paper develops a model of normativity that distinguishes between four different 
levels: moral intuition, explicit morality, ethical theory, and meta-ethics. After establishing the relevance 
of the model to IS, the paper discusses pertinent application areas such as privacy and intellectual 
property. This review points to the main areas of discussion. In addition, it provides a further link 
between normativity and IS by demonstrating that IS technical developments pose new problems for 
normative theory and practice and that scholars in the relevant reference disciplines, notably in moral 
philosophy, can benefit from understanding these issues in depth. The paper concludes by pointing to 
currently underdeveloped research areas in normativity and IS and by suggesting how such work can 
contribute to the theoretical and practical relevance of both IS and the normative disciplines. 
2. Levels of Normativity 
The reader may have noticed that I use the rather unfamiliar term "normativity" rather than the more 
familiar terms related to norms such as ethics, morality, or law. I chose this terminology because it 
allows us to draw conceptual distinctions between ethics, morality, law, and other related terms such as 
values or worth, while retaining an overarching concept, which is that of normativity. 
 
 
  
Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 13, Issue 8, pp. 636-656, August 2012 
Stahl / Morality, Ethics, and Reflection 
638 
This paper draws on several disciplines and discourses, and each of these define the terms 
presented here differently in their own right. The main literature body that the paper builds on is that 
of philosophy or, more specifically, moral philosophy, and even more specifically the part of moral 
philosophy that deals with technology – ICT in particular. Philosophy is a large and old field, and 
discourses on normativity in philosophy fill whole libraries. This paper cannot, therefore, do justice to 
all positions and definitions. As such, the following subsections develop a conceptual framework 
and underpin it by references to the literature. However, it would be impossible to adequately 
represent all possible positions. 
 
Despite this non-exclusive nature of the model developed here, researchers and practitioners outside 
of IS will find it relevant. The paper returns to the problem of the relevance of technical developments 
for moral philosophy in general, and, in particular, to the importance of the normative model 
developed here. The argument is that novel technologies raise normative issues that are 
quantitatively or qualitatively different from previous ones; and novel technologies can open new 
ways to address these normative issues. The model developed here can help interested parties to 
conceptualize these issues. However, before I introduce this argument, I need to introduce the 
normative model. The following figure overviews all four levels of the model – moral intuition, explicit 
morality, ethical theory, and reflection and meta-ethics – and their relationship one another. The 
sections below describe these in more detail. 
 
 
Moral intuition (“This is right / wrong.”)
Explicit morality (“One should always / never do this.”)
Ethical theory (“Doing X is right / wrong because…”)
Reflection and meta-ethics 
(“Different ethical positions agree 
that X is right / wrong”)
constitutes basis informs
justifiesis reflected in
requires clarifies
 
Figure 1. Levels of Normativity 
 
As Figure 1 illustrates, these four levels are mutually dependent and, in practice, often overlap. The 
distinction is, therefore, analytical in nature, and allows for a richer understanding of pertinent 
phenomena. In the following discussion of the levels, I start at the bottom of the pyramid with the 
most ubiquitous aspect of normativity. In the following sections, I first introduce each level in general 
terms and then relate them to the IS literature. 
2.1. Level 1: Moral Intuition 
We can define moral intuition as the non-reflected reaction that individuals have when faced with 
issues that they perceive to be good or bad (Kekes, 1986). This reaction is correlated to almost 
involuntary utterances such as "this is good" or "that cannot be right". Most human beings have this 
sort of reaction to a wide range of issues and actions. Moral intuition is a fact of life. We always 
encounter it; there is no way to avoid it. 
 
  
Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 13, Issue 8, pp. 636-656, August 2012 
 
Stahl / Morality, Ethics, and Reflection 
639 
In the IS discipline, it is easy to imagine a multitude of situations where moral intuition accompanies 
particular technologies or development. Examples might be: "It was about time that they got a system 
to get proper cost control" or "management should not spy on employees using the system". 
 
Moral intuition drives all of us to a large degree, but it may be entirely misplaced. Moreover, it is often 
not explicitly articulated. We act on it and follow it, but we rarely think it through. One reason why it 
remains implicit is that it tends to be shared by the local community. Groups, cultures, and nations 
share moral intuitions; arguably, they are to a large extent defined by them. They simplify the world 
because they provide an apparently shared view of the world. However, they sometimes lead to 
problems when they are no longer shared. 
2.1.1. Moral Intuition in Information Systems 
The strongest and best established tradition of normative research in IS relates to issues of moral 
intuition, namely whether something is perceived to be right or wrong, good or bad. Such moral 
intuitions are important for IS because they can have significant impact on the use and success of 
information systems. They relate to whether technology is conducive to social and organizational goals. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that a seminal paper on ethics and IS (Mason, 1986) lists four moral issues 
that many individuals have strong intuitions about: Privacy, accuracy, property, and access. It is 
interesting to note that Mason’s paper, which set the tone for much research that was to follow (and also 
for some critique – see Fairweather, 2000) was an opinion piece that relied neither on empirical data, 
nor on the existing literature. Several of these issues have developed separate discussions that spann 
different levels of normativity and that cover other fields beyond IS. I discuss some of these, such as 
privacy and intellectual property, in more depth below in the section on application areas. 
 
Another concern worth mentioning here has to do with behavior that is widely regarded as immoral, 
notably the criminal use of IS. This area, too, is related to many other disciplines and can be traced 
back to times when business use of IS was just developing (Parker, 1983). The interest in criminal 
misuse of IS is shared with computer security, forensic computing, and computer law, but it is also an 
ongoing stream of activities in IS (Wareham, Robey, & Chua, 2008). It is related to other types of 
misuse that do not necessarily have to be criminal in nature, such as plagiarism (Davison & Kock, 2003). 
 
Researching moral intuitions has been a core activity of IS research interested in normative aspects. 
This type of research has the advantage of being relatively easy to do using established empirical 
approaches. Moral intuitions can be explored by observing behavior or by interacting with 
respondents. When direct questions about moral intuitions are asked, these can then change their 
nature and turn into explicit morality, which the next section outlines. 
2.2. Level 2: Explicit Morality 
A core problem of moral intuition is that it relies on two sometimes mutually exclusive conditions: 
internal consistency and external consensus. Moral intuition carries the connotation of consensus with 
the peer group. It breaks down when this consensus disintegrates (Cushman, Young, & Hauser, 2006).  
This is where explicit morality sets in. Explicit morality typically has the form of statements that clearly 
denote what is right or wrong. Examples might be: "Companies can do what serves their bottom line” 
or "employees do not have to do what employers tell them if it is against their conscience". This type 
of statement is required when there is disagreement on implicit morality. Is it acceptable for the 
company to use the system for employee monitoring? Specific stances such as the ones just referred 
to can be contentious. If they are, then the first step in the attempt to clarify what is acceptable is to 
state clearly what people already perceive to be acceptable. 
 
Explicit morality is, as the term suggests, something that is open to discussion. It needs to be openly 
stated. In most cases, it is the attempt to make explicit what individuals perceive to be the shared 
moral intuition. Moral philosophy knows several terms that refer to explicit morality. One of these is 
the term "value". Something is a value when it is considered as having worth; when it serves society 
as a whole. Explicit morality is relatively easy to discern and measure. Thus, it is not surprising that IS 
focuses attention on explicit morality. 
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2.2.1. Explicit Morality in Information Systems 
Explicit morality has found its way in one of the dominant streams of positivist and quantitative 
research, namely as “subjective norms” in the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991). These 
subjective norms have been shown to have significant influence on the adoption and use of 
technology and, therefore, now constitute a core element of such research in numerous different 
areas from the adoption of WAP-enabled mobile phones (Teo & Pok, 2003) to mobile payment 
services (Schierz, Schilke, & Wirtz, 2010). While this approach demonstrates the relevance of 
normative issues in IS research and practice, the theory of planned behavior’s particular approach 
does not specify which and how moral norms affect technology use. Thus, there have been 
numerous attempts to clearly specify the type of explicit morality and its role in the use of IS. 
 
In order to clarify the norms involved in adoption and use of technology, IS researchers have 
explored the moral norms of particular stakeholder groups, which includes students, practitioners, 
and consumers. Students have been represented in research as important stakeholders whose 
moral rules and norms should be understood (Couger, 1989). On occasion, such research on 
students has been used as a proxy to understand employee views (Paradice, 1990). And, not 
surprisingly, IS scholars are interested in customers’ or consumers’ moral views because these can 
affect economic decisions (Culnan, 1993). 
 
Interest in stakeholders’ explicit views of morality tends to be directly motivated by functional 
interests. Infringing moral views can lead to customer rejection or failure to adopt systems. Given the 
sometimes close relationship between moral and legal issues, there is also an interest in normative 
issues to limit liability. In the case of research on students, an common explicit motivation is the wish 
to affect their moral preferences and make them “better” professionals. Understanding employees, for 
example, can also allow the enforcement of rules and ensuring compliance. Thus, moral views and 
perceptions have functional relevance for organizations because they can affect their business 
processes. An interest in this functional aspect of morality in IS has pervaded IS research for decades 
(Straub & Collins, 1990) and continues to be relevant today (Cavusoglu, Benbasat, & Bulgurcu, 2010) 
 
One further reason why interest in explicit morality is likely to remain high in IS is that such explicit 
moral rules often mirror a typical approach to professional ethics, namely that of codes of conduct or 
codes of ethics. The National Machine Accountants Association (NMAA), renamed first into the Data 
Processing Management Association (DPMA) in 1962 and into the Association of Information 
Technology Professionals (AITP) in 1986 may have been the first to create an explicit code of ethics 
in 1951, which, in a modified version, is still in force1. Further relevant professional bodies include the 
Association for Computing Machinery2, the British Computer Society3, the IEEE Computer Society4, 
and also the Association for Information Systems5
 
. This shows that attempts to define shared moral 
norms have accompanied the development of information technology. Given the prominence of such 
codes as means to express moral standards, it is not surprising that they have been the subject of IS 
research (Walsham, 1996) and figure prominently in much of the work discussed in this paper. 
Despite such attention on explicit morality, research on normativity does not stop at this level. The 
fact that implicit morality or moral intuition needs to be made explicit indicates that they are not 
universally shared. While explicit morality may denote the moral consensus of a group, there is no 
guarantee that it does so. And even if a particular group agrees on moral issues, there is no 
guarantee that this agreement is universally shared. Neither is it clear whether the grounds on which 
it is deemed to be acceptable are generally accepted as valid. To come to an understanding of moral 
issues, however, there needs to be agreement not only on what is good or bad, but also on why it is 
good or bad. This is where ethical theory becomes relevant. 
                                                     
1  Retrieved 27th September, 2011, from http://www.aitp.org/?page=Ethics&hhSearchTerms=ethics 
2  Retrieved 14th March, 2011, from http://www.acm.org/about/code-of-ethics 
3  Retrieved 14th March, 2011, from http://www.bcs.org/content/conWebDoc/1587 
4  Retrieved 28th September, 2011, from http://www.computer.org/portal/web/guest/home 
5  Retrieved 14th March, 2011, from http://home.aisnet.org/displaycommon.cfm?an=1&subarticlenbr=15 
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2.3. Level 3: Ethical Theory 
Where moral statements are contradictory or in conflict, there is a need for a higher level of 
abstraction. All normative statements imply such a higher level of abstraction, but it is not always 
clear for what this abstraction and reflection stand. 
 
This paper uses the term "ethics" to denote the abstract and theoretical reflection on moral statements. 
Ethics asks for the grounds on which moral statements are made. Why do we think something is good, 
right, or acceptable? Ethics in this sense is one of the main branches of philosophy and has been 
discussed for millennia. The distinction between morality as social fact and ethics as reflection, while not 
ubiquitously accepted, is widely recognized (Adam, 2005; Ricoeur, 1990; Siponen & Vartiainen, 2002), 
even though sometimes slightly different terminology is used (Moores & Chang, 2006). 
 
Prominent ethical theories include consequentialism and (Kantian) deontology. Utilitarianism, the 
most prominent consequentialist ethical theory, goes back to Jeremy Bentham (2009), James Mill 
(1829), John Stuart Mill (2002), and others who wanted to render the enterprise of moral philosophy 
more rational and scientific, which emulates the success of the natural sciences in the 18th and 19th 
centuries. The main idea of utilitarian ethics is to compare the aggregated utility and disutility of each 
alternative option. The ethical decision is the one that maximizes overall utility. In essence, this 
approach concentrates exclusively on the outcomes or consequences of decisions, which is the 
reason why it is usually called “consequentialist”. 
 
Kantian deontology (1986, 1998), on the other hand, takes a fundamentally different approach and 
evaluates the ethical quality of a decision according to the intention of the agent. Famously linked to 
the so-called categorical imperative, the ethical evaluation of a maxim depends on whether it can be 
universalized or imagined as a universal law. An alternative formulation stipulates that a maxim is 
ethically acceptable if it treats humans as ends in themselves, not merely as means. The approach is 
called deontological (from Greek deon, “obligation, duty”) because it concentrates on the duty-bound 
intention of the agent with little regard for consequences. 
 
A final group of ethical theories often discussed in information systems discounts both the relevance 
of consequences and of duty, but instead concentrates on the individual. This is the family of virtue 
ethics, where the theoretical distinction between good and bad is not made on the grounds of external 
aspects of an action, but instead based on the way in which an action reflects on the character of the 
individual. This family of ethical theory goes back to classical antiquity – to Plato (1945) and Aristotle 
(2007) – and finds its current instantiations in contemporary virtue ethics (MacIntyre, 2007). 
 
These three approaches are important because they are the dominant theories currently discussed 
and they capture much of our moral intuition. At the same time, one needs to see that there is a 
wealth of other ethical theories that could be considered. Many of these combine aspects of the 
above theories or try to overcome particular weaknesses (Ross, 2002). Aristotelian and neo-
Aristotelian theories of virtue ethics (Bynum, 2006), feminist ethics of care (Adam, 2005), and ethical 
approaches more specifically aimed at technology, such as disclose ethics (Brey, 2000; Introna, 
2005), are particularly influential in discussions of ethics in computing and information systems. There 
has also been some debate about the limitations and applicability of traditional ethical theories in the 
information society (Floridi, 1999; Floridi & Sanders, 2002). 
2.3.1. Ethical Theory in Information Systems 
The research described in the last two major sections has shown that moral intuitions and explicit 
morality are not always consistent and, even where they are, can be opposed to researchers’ 
assumptions or prevailing law. Thus, there have been several attempts to provide sound ethical 
theories for the use or application in IS. Given the richness of ethical theory outside of IS, such work 
often takes existing bodies of literature in ethics and imports them into IS. Smith & Hasnas (1999) 
were among the first to do this. They apply several business ethics approaches to IS. More 
specifically, they compare the stockholder theory, the stakeholder theory, and the social contract 
theory to businesses and discuss how these relate to IS. 
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There are many more ethical theories beyond those of business ethics. Even in business ethics, there 
are more theories than the three just enumerated. There have been many attempts to apply these or 
make them usable to the area of IS. However, most such work is done outside the field of IS, notably 
in the area of computer and information ethics (Brey & Soraker, 2009; Floridi, 2010; Johnson, 2001; 
van den Hoven, 2008; van den Hoven & Weckert, 2008). 
 
In parallel to a richer discourse on ethical theory and IS or ICT in other fields, one can observe a 
renewed interest in this topic area in the more bounded field of IS. A recent Journal of the Association 
for Information Systems special issue (Bryant, Land, & King, 2009) explores several ethical 
approaches. Ethical theory applied to IS includes postmodern ethics (Sarker, Fuller, & Chatterjee, 
2009), Habermasian discourse ethics (Mingers & Walsham, 2010), and also novel ethical approaches 
such as disclosive ethics(Light & McGrath, 2010). The breadth of this debate is increasing with 
attempts to understand the complexities of ethic’s cultural aspects (Martinsons & Ma, 2009). At the 
same time, one can still observe more instrumental work on ethics as a vehicle of professionalism 
(Martinsons et al., 2009) or as a means to encourage organizational change (Culnan & Williams, 2009). 
 
A difficult investigational topic is the relationship between ethical reasoning and moral practice. It 
raises numerous epistemological challenges and has to make strong assumptions about the 
rationality of agents. Nevertheless, it is important to find out why individuals think that certain acts 
or rules are morally appropriate and how they construct their relationship between ethics and 
morality, and, consequently, there has been research in this area (Myyry, Siponen, Pahnila, 
Vartiainen, & Vance, 2009). 
2.4. Level 4: Reflection and Meta-Ethics 
The different ethical theories offer different reasons why something would be considered good or right 
and may lead to conflicting recommendations. This next higher level for ethics is often called meta-
ethics in philosophy (Marturano, 2002; Sayre-McCord, 2007). In this paper, I call it reflection because 
it is the next higher level of reflection that relates to normative issues. 
 
Meta-ethics can establish relationships between different ethical theories and find ways to mediate 
between them or allow communication about their differences. Meta-ethical debates attempt to make 
sense of contradictory or inconsistent ethical positions. They tend to focus on conceptual basics: on 
what we mean by good, evil, right, or wrong. They explore how ethical theories evaluate and establish 
their positions on morality. Meta-ethical debates can also cover issues that are pertinent to many or 
all ethical theories, such as difficult questions concerning who can be a moral subject or why such a 
subject would want to act morally. Meta-ethics has a dialectical nature and rarely leads to general 
consensus. Its purpose is to extract disagreements, conflicts, or contradictions with a view to facilitate 
discourses and, where possible, temporary closure. One reason why meta-ethical reflection is 
needed is that different ethical theories may evaluate moral norms differently and support different 
positions or actions. To return to the example of information systems used to collect data on 
employees, the evaluations from different ethical theories are not easy to predict. For example, a 
utilitarian analysis, depending on how utilities are measured and compared, may decide that such a 
use of technology is or is not morally permitted. 
 
Meta-ethics is a philosophical endeavor in which most IS scholars have only a limited interest. There 
is, however, at least one aspect of meta-ethics that is relevant to IS, namely the reflective exploration 
of the conditions of application of ethical judgments and moral views. Meta-ethics as the higher level 
of reflection of ethics has to take into consideration whether and in what way the evaluations and 
recommendations of ethical theories can be put into practice. If, for example, the moral issue is 
whether customer data should be collected using an IS, then a utilitarian position may hold that this 
would be acceptable, whereas a contradictory Kantian view might be that it would be an infringement 
of human dignity and thus unacceptable. Meta-ethics can now attempt to reconcile these different 
views, explore their differences, or find another ethical position from which to discuss the issue. 
Importantly, such a meta-ethical discussion needs to relate the different levels of abstraction 
discussed so far. This means that we need to consider not only theoretical ideas, but also practices, 
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local perceptions, and different views. This means that the abstract norm has to be put into a local 
and practical context, which requires that those who are affected are heard and allowed to 
influence the eventual outcomes. 
2.4.1. Reflection and Meta-Ethics in Information Systems 
Engaging with ethical theory has not led to a clear solution of normative dilemmas or diverging 
intuitions or norms. This is to be expected given the history of philosophical ethics. In light of the 
multiplicity of ethical theories and moral views and convictions, one way forward is to attempt to find a 
higher level of abstraction that allows for a broader understanding and contextualization of the 
different ethical approaches. 
 
One way of engaging in such meta-ethical work is to describe and compare different ethical theories. 
Indeed, some work on ethical theory includes such meta-ethical analyses (Smith & Hasnas, 1999), 
while other work concentrates exclusively on it (Bull, 2009). Meta-ethics is a topic of philosophy but not 
a core concern of the vast majority of IS scholars. It is, nevertheless, important for IS scholars interested 
in normative topics because it points to a core challenge of such research. The challenge is how to use 
normative insights and understandings that range from implicit intuitions up to elaborate ethical theories, 
how to live with their inconsistencies and contradictions, and yet how to use them to improve the status 
quo. To put it differently, one can ask how one can move from a descriptive understanding of norms to 
useful and practical prescriptions. Part of the answer is to establish governance arrangements that allow 
individuals to develop and voice their moral views and to engage with others in ways that are conducive 
to mutual understanding (Lenoble & Maesschalck, 2010). 
 
In the recent past, there have been attempts in IS to engage in this higher level reflection. These 
attempts explore ethical theories or research approaches that allow for such incorporation of material 
morality and sound theory. One notable attempt was Mingers & Walsham’s (2010) paper that 
introduces Habermasian discourse ethics (Habermas, 1983, 1991) to IS. Discourse ethic’s principal 
and characterizing aim is for all stakeholders to reach a consensus about the moral evaluation of a 
situation. Based on Habermas’s (1981) theory of communicative action, discourse ethics assumes 
that an ideal discourse would lead to a consensus on moral matters and to ways of engaging with 
them. This paper cannot go into discourse ethics in any depth. Suffice to say that discourse ethics 
seriously considers the fact that people have different moral views and intuitions. It provides a 
mechanism that allows those individual differences to lead to a collectively acceptable outcome by 
relying on cooperation of the individuals involved. 
 
A further approach put forward to provide a way to ethical reflection in IS is that of critical research. 
Several observers have recently noted that critical research requires an explicit normative 
commitment from its practitioners (Myers & Klein, 2011; Stahl, 2008a). Critical research is based on 
the normative premise that the world can be improved and that research should contribute to such 
improvement. The critical approach is furthermore characterized by its self-reflection; that is, its 
explicit attention to the assumptions on which it is based (Cecez-Kecmanovic, 2001; Doolin & 
McLeod, 2005; Richardson & Robinson, 2007). This reflexive nature of critical research, combined 
with its normative basis, requires critical IS scholars to take into account moral positions, to consider 
how these influence individuals’ views of what is desirable, and to critically engage in negotiating 
these different normative views. 
 
These two related approaches of discourse ethics and critical research give initial pointers toward 
possibly appropriate ways to move toward a higher level that allows dealing with the cacophony of 
moral stances without falling prey to simplistic solutions. However, they are far from fully developed. 
What these examples show is that there are activities in this area in the IS discipline. If IS wants to 
identify and address ethical issues, then these are promising starting points on which to build further work. 
 
I have now developed the normative model with its four different levels, and Figure 2 can graphically 
represent its development in IS. Finally, IS scholars have taken initial and tentative steps to explore 
the next step – that is, how ethical self-reflection can be incorporated into research in IS. 
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While Figure 2 cannot claim scientific exactness, and while there may be scope for debate about the 
exact placing of the different publications, it gives a strong visual indication that there are developments 
in normative IS research and that there is a trend towards engaging with higher level abstract work. At 
the same time, research on the descriptive side of morality continues to be undertaken. 
 
In order to avoid undue criticism, it should be repeated that this is not an exclusive model or that it 
does not claim to cover all aspects of normativity. The model shows four important aspects of 
normativity that can be found in IS research. Another important aspect is that, while the model 
suggests a sort of hierarchy, this should not be seen as an evaluation. Ethical theory is not more 
important or "better" than moral intuition or explicit moral statements. The hierarchy refers to the 
frequency in which such issues arise as well as the level of abstraction involved. The four different 
levels refer to one another and are often present simultaneously. 
 
A final cautionary remark is that this model does not lend itself to produce "right" answers. Normative 
questions tend to be contested and complex. They involve a difficult mix of descriptive and non-
descriptive aspects. There is no algorithmic way to come to clear prescriptions on what should be done. 
This statement does not imply a moral relativism (which, in terms of this paper, would be a position in 
the category of "ethical theories"), but instead points to the fact that normative issues are always 
enacted and permanently subject to change due to different contributions to pertinent discourses. 
3. Application Areas 
On the basis of this abstract conceptualization of the role of normativity in IS, this paper now 
proceeds to look at particular application areas. This demonstrates the usefulness of the normative 
models by exploring some well-known issues in more depth. Before proceeding to the areas of 
privacy and intellectual property, the section briefly explores the degree to which any of the ethical 
issues treated in IS are relevant and of interest to moral philosophy more generally. 
3.1. The Relevance of IS to Ethics 
Thus far, this paper takes ideas from moral philosophy and develops a model of normativity that is 
then applied to IS. It is legitimate to ask whether this constitutes a sufficient contribution to 
knowledge. There is a long-standing tradition in IS that argues that output from the IS discipline 
should be a contribution to the reference discipline and should be publishable in the reference 
discipline (Keen, 1980). The present paper adopts aspects of this position by using the term 
“reference disciplines” even though this idea of parent-child relationship between the reference 
disciplines and IS is problematic (Baskerville & Myers, 2002). 
 
Nevertheless, it is useful when assessing the present narrative’s relevance to ask whether scholars 
who focus on moral philosophy would benefit from engaging with the model developed in this paper. 
The normative model developed above can be seen as a unique contribution to ethical theory that 
does not exist in its current form in the literature, even though it is of course built on similar 
categorizations. It addresses conceptual shortcomings in previous empirical research on normative 
issues. It explores the relationships between IS, technology, organizations, and ethics more 
generally. Put differently, is there anything in technology or modern organizations that raises 
normative issues that existing approaches to ethics cannot solve? This is a difficult question that has 
been discussed extensively in similar forms in all fields of applied ethics such as business ethics or 
bioethics. It has spawned a debate in computer ethics around the concept of uniqueness (Tavani, 
2002). The present paper does not require a strong position on this issue but agrees with the view 
that modern technology and its organizational use raises issues that older approaches to ethics and 
morality did not have to deal with. Examples of such issues with relevance to IS include the 
discussion about whether novel technologies may create new types of entities that may have moral 
values or responsibilities, such as autonomous agents (Allen, Smit, & Wallach, 2005). Some authors 
suggest that information (Capurro, 2008; Floridi, 2006) may have moral value. On a more practical 
level, one can observe or predict changes to individual or collective behavior caused or affected by 
hitherto unknown quantities of information and ways of processing it. As such, the following 
subsections explore privacy and intellectual property to see how the field of IS has dealt with them. 
  
Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 13, Issue 8, pp. 636-656, August 2012 
Stahl / Morality, Ethics, and Reflection 
646 
3.2. Privacy 
Privacy is an important aspect of interpersonal relationships, and concerns about privacy are probably 
as old as humanity. The technical capability of storing one’s image without one’s consent as afforded 
by the camera led to the initial legal codification of privacy as an aspect of a broader “right to be let 
alone” (Warren & Brandeis, 1890). Privacy was recognized as an important concern in information 
technology at approximately the same time that IS began to emerge as a recognizable entity (Westin, 
1967). Not surprisingly, it was the first concept in Mason’s (1986) PAPA (Privacy, Accuracy, Property, 
Accessibility) acronym and has played an important role in normative IS research ever since. 
 
Moral intuitions about privacy as well as explicit morality can be easily researched. This is reflected in 
research on privacy in IS; for example, Straub and Collins (1990) look at the possible liability that 
arises from piracy, proprietary databases, and privacy. Measuring privacy perceptions by individuals 
remaines a strong stream of IS research (Culnan, 1993; Smith, Milberg, & Burke, 1996). 
 
As a ubiquitous moral issue, privacy is subject to a range of different ethical interpretations. Thus, it 
is not surprising that a rich landscape of theoretical descriptions has developed (Tavani, 2008). 
What is interesting to note is that much of this theoretical reflection and justification of privacy is 
done outside of the field of IS. Even where individuals who could be counted among IS scholars do 
conceptual work on privacy, such as Introna (2003), they tend to publish in outlets outside of 
mainstream IS. Such more abstract debates are nevertheless of core importance to IS because 
they inform us about the relevance and consistency of moral positions. Without an ethical and 
theoretical grounding of privacy it is impossible to come to a well-grounded position on, for 
example, whether privacy is an absolute value or a relative one, whether it is related to ownership 
in data, or whether it is a human right. Each of these have practical implications for the use of IS for 
data collection and, thus, for individual privacy. 
 
Privacy concerns have long been established and, as a consequence, they have developed into 
parallel discourses in other fields. Privacy has led to significant legislative activities around the globe, 
which has resulted in much research from different angles such as sociology and legal studies. Legal 
concerns with privacy are typically expressed in data protection legislation; for example, the 
European Directive 95/46/EC, which obliges all EU Member States to legislate strict data protection. 
There are numerous scholarly journals that deal exclusively with privacy concerns. Some of this 
activity is then reflected back in mainstream IS work (Culnan & Williams, 2009; Smith et al., 1996). 
 
On the last level of abstraction, the level of meta-ethics and reflection, one can find much work on 
privacy. Tavani (2008) and others offer summary accounts of different ethical positions. Meta-ethical 
considerations are crucial for understanding data protection legislation because one can argue, for 
example, that the different data protection regimes in the US and EU are at least partially a 
consequence of different ethical positions (Stahl, 2008b). What is largely missing in the IS discipline, 
however, is the ethical reflection on the meaning of the more prevalent description of morality. While 
meta-ethical discussions are sometimes referenced in normative IS work, they are generally not in 
the centre of attention. 
 
A similar picture can be observed in the second field of application – intellectual property – which I 
discuss in Section 3.3. 
3.3. Intellectual Property 
Electronic data and information raises a number of interesting legal and ethical issues that are far 
from solved. Topics of debate include the moral evaluation of user activities, such as content 
downloading, as well as ownership in data, information, content, or software. 
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The issue of how intellectual property and its moral status are perceived can intimately affect the 
interests of organizations and it is, therefore, no wonder that of IS scholars have shown an interest 
(Conger, Loch, & Helft, 1995). This is particularly true for new developments that can change 
business models, such as with the open source movement (Agerfalk & Fitzgerald, 2008; Koch, 2005; 
Sharma, Sugumaran, & Rajagopalan, 2002; Stewart & Gosain, 2006). 
 
While attitudes towards intellectual property are important to understand, they need to be linked to 
a conceptual understanding of the justification of property in general and the influence that 
information technology has on this. Briefly, property in general can be defined as a “bundle of 
rights” (Velasquez, 2002, p. 433), which includes the rights to exclusive use, to sell, to trade, or to 
generate income. This raises the question of the origin of the right and different positions in this 
regard posit different ethical theories. Utilitarian justifications of property hold that the overall state 
of society is better because of the attribution of rights; others hold that property rights are 
intrinsically linked to the individual who created the property. 
 
While matters of physical property are largely settled in democratic societies, there are significant 
differences between physical and intellectual property, and information technology changes 
numerous important aspects (Spinello & Tavani, 2004). Intellectual property is non-exclusive, which 
means that one person’s use of it does not exclude another person’s use. Its cost structure is vastly 
different from physical property with the marginal cost of additional copies being negligible 
compared with the cost of original production. These differences between physical and intellectual 
property lead to diverging ethical evaluations of the various ways of dealing with them. This can 
explain to some extent the fact that intellectual property and physical property are treated 
differently with numerous users being willing to infringe intellectual property regulations who would 
not do so for physical property. 
 
The different ethical positions lend themselves to meta-ethical analysis, and much work on IT and 
intellectual property has focused on such meta-ethical and conceptual issues that arise from the 
justification of intellectual property and its practical implementation and use. Just as in the case of 
privacy, this topic is so important that it has led to a raft of legislation that includes innumerable 
international treaties and conventions. There are numerous journals that deal, mostly from a legal 
angle, with intellectual property. Meta-ethical analyses influence legal scholars as much as they do 
philosophers. And, again, just as is true for privacy, an understanding of the meta-ethical perspective 
is required to understand and evaluate not just ethical theories but also moral views and intuitions. 
 
Table 1 briefly summarizes some of the literature this paper discusses. The table’s purpose is to 
show the distribution of normative work in IS, which then allows for a discussion of current 
shortcomings and future research agendas in the area of normativity and IS. For each paper, the 
table contains the short reference, the topic, an indication of the normative level, the research 
approach, and the paper’s key message. The table contains only those papers that are clearly 
located in the field of IS and purposely excludes papers from other disciplines or such publications 
that precede the field of IS as defined above. 
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4. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper develops a model of normative research in IS based on four levels: moral intuition, explicit 
morality, ethical theory, and reflection and meta-ethics. It shows that all of these levels of normativity 
are relevant and can be found in the IS literature. 
 
Looking at the examples of privacy and intellectual property one can see, however, that the higher 
levels of normative research tend to be undertaken outside of the field of IS. The relevance of IS is 
thus confined to providing data for other researchers. This is not only unsatisfactory in terms of the 
standing of the field, but it is also problematic because it neglects significant contributions to some 
normative issues that IS has already made over a long period of time. One particular area of 
relevance relates to the meta-ethical reflection on how ethical principles can be implemented into 
organizational morality. There are numerous possible views on this, but one that appears to have 
gained momentum is to broaden the democratic and participative input into research and technology 
development. In the European context, this is currently being promoted under the heading of 
“responsible innovation” (European Commission, 2011; Kjolberg & Strand, 2011; Owen & Goldberg, 
2010). While the debate on responsible innovation is just beginning, it is clear that the IS discipline 
has an enormous wealth of experience in this area of participative work (Adams & Blandford, 2005; 
Cecez-Kecmanovic & Janson, 2009; Hirschheim & Klein, 1994; Mumford, 1995, 2003; Mumford & 
Henshall, 1978; Olphert & Damodaran, 2007). The challenge is to explicitly link these approaches 
back to ethical theories and moral practice. Generally, previous work in these areas, even the 
conspicuously named ETHICS methodology developed by Mumford and her collaborators, lacks a 
strong grounding in ethical theory and fails to undertake meta-ethical reflection (Stahl, 2007). Once 
this conceptual lacuna is filled, IS researchers could make important contributions by empircally 
exploring whether and in what way such participation meets normative expectations. 
 
These observations suggest that there are areas where engagement with normativity in IS is currently 
underdeveloped, which leads to the implications for the field discussed in Section 4.1. 
4.1. Implications for IS 
Not every IS researcher is explicitly interested in normative issues. Information systems research 
largely takes place in profit-oriented organizations, and many IS scholars may sympathize with Milton 
Friedman’s (1970) dictum that it is the social responsibility of business to increase its profits. This 
would seem to imply that IS could legitimately ignore issues of normativity. Such a position would 
miss the important point, however, that normativity is an integral aspect of any social interaction, and 
scholars and practitioners ignore it at their peril. Technology acceptance and adoption, to name a 
topic widely researched in IS, depends on numerous issues, but moral perceptions and their ethical 
justification play an important role. The business world is part of greater society and has to conform to 
existing expectations of behavior. One could argue that the constitution of market economies is based 
on moral principles (Smith, 2008). 
 
Moreover, there is an intrinsic link between research and normativity. All research aims to create new 
knowledge. Such new knowledge, whether applied or fancifal, is generally perceived to be a (morally) 
good thing that is open to varying ethical justifications. It may be good because it leads to economic 
growth and prosperity, or just because it helps us to understand the world. In many cases, research is 
funded by public resources and should, therefore, consider public interests. While there are thus a 
number of normative principles involved in research, one can state that most, if not all, research has 
some sort of moral relevance and, thus, requires the researcher involved in it to be able to reflect on 
its moral position. This means that the researcher needs to be aware not only of the different moral 
intuitions and explicit moral views, but also of ethical theories and meta-ethical reflection. 
 
In addition to this general awareness of normativity, IS scholars engaged in research on normative 
issues need to have a deeper knowledge of approaches, methods, and theories. While some 
research on moral intuition or explicit morality does not differ much from any other empirical research 
describing respondents’ views and perceptions, work on normative issues raises some problems that 
social scientists do not normally encounter. One such problem arises from the relationship of norms 
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and facts. The justification of normative statements must be drawn from normative premises and 
cannot be deduced from observation. This is an idea that is usually linked to Hume (2004) and Moore 
(1999). Drawing a normative conclusion from descriptive research is often called the "naturalistic 
fallacy". A different way of saying this is that "ought" cannot be deduced from "is" (the is-ought 
problem). The interplay of facts and norms is more complex than can be developed here. To give an 
example of research on ethics in IS that commits the naturalistic fallacy, one could imagine a project 
that investigates people's attitudes to employee surveillance and, based on the findings that the 
majority of respondents involved find the practice acceptable, would conclude that it is morally 
permitted. Such conclusions can still be found in IS research and they demonstrate that there is 
insufficient awareness of the complexity of normativity. 
4.2. Further Research 
This paper argues that one can observe an increasing amount of sophistication in the engagement of 
the IS field with regards to normative issues. At the same time, this analysis supports the contention 
that the IS community has not reached its potential in this regard and that a further development of 
the way in which normative issues are addressed is now in order. This refers in particular to work on 
higher levels of abstraction. It is no longer good enough to just study given moral preferences. These 
need to be studied in conjunction with the underlying ethical theories. The IS community has started 
to explore the rich body of ethical thinking and to look for ways of making such theories relevant for IS 
research and practice. Some research areas that are important to examine and that require further 
research are listed below: 
 
• Shared ethical positions across IS: It is unlikely that, in a pluralistic modern society, we will 
converge on moral intuitions and explicit moralities as debates surrounding privacy and 
intellectual property indicate. This does not mean, however, that the only remaining option 
is moral relativism. Instead, engaging with ethical theory and meta-ethics may point ways 
towards what Rawls (1987) calls “overlapping consensus”; that is, shared views or shared 
ethical perspectives. An important aspect is that of the overall role of IS research. The vast 
majority of IS research is functional in that it takes for granted the socio-economic system in 
which organizations use technology and does not question the justification of distributions 
of resources and power. While this position has long been challenged by critical scholars, 
the present paper suggests that it may also be problematic from a normative position and 
that such a normative position may extend to other, non-critical work. 
 
• Governance, implementation, relevance: The importance of meta-ethical reflection in the 
overall scheme of normative work suggests that scholars interested in normative aspects 
need to go beyond description of morality and its theoretical review. Reflecting on 
normativity implies the implementation of moral positions are important. Does a particular 
IS reflect moral views and allow for ethical justification? What are the governance 
structures that govern the system and how do they reflect moral preferences? Which 
moral views are relevant, how are they reflected in the system and the organization, and 
how does this relate to the technical and organizational underpinnings? Such questions 
are theoretically important and practically shape all aspects of IS. 
 
• Policy, law, and responsibilities: While the preceding points mainly deal with IS in 
organizations, this final recommended research area looks at the larger societal context 
of IS. Novel technologies are developed and implemented in existing social and legal 
frameworks, which affects numerous aspects of normativity. Both privacy and IP are good 
examples of this. IS researchers tend to take this framework for granted and either fail to 
engage with it at all or accept it as given. However, the detailed empirical insights into the 
use of technology, in conjunction with a deeper understanding of normativity, would allow 
them to go beyond this and influence policy makers, drive policies, and define 
responsibilities. Their specific insights should make them sought-after partners in policy 
development and active shapers rather than passive observers of the larger socio-cultural 
environment of IS. 
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Overall, the present analysis of normativity in IS shows that the topic is of central importance the 
discipline and that the understanding of such normative issues in the IS community is developing. 
While IS research is strong in those areas of normativity that are open to established empirical 
methods, there is no strong understanding yet on how theoretical insights gained through such 
normative research can be translated back into IS practice. By developing the normative model, this 
paper contributes to a theoretical framework that is both philosophically sound and practically relevant 
in IS. It can contribute to a deeper understanding of normative issues and thereby stimulate research 
in the areas outlined above. This should strengthen the field as a whole and lead to more normatively 
sensitive, and thus more acceptable, uses of information systems in all application areas. 
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